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431 
THE “PARCEL AS A WHOLE” IN CONTEXT: SHIFTING THE 








Perhaps more than any other area of law, land use planning 
manifests current societal values.  From the application of skeptical 
substantive due process analyses to regulation of land uses to mod-
ern-day urban growth boundaries, underlying notions of property 
rights, fairness, and investment-backed expectations have long played 
a significant role in the development of property law and land use 
controls.1  This article will study but one aspect of this overall thesis, 
judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause to 
achieve fairness in a certain regulatory context, the selection of the 
precise parcel on which a takings analysis must focus when evaluat-
ing a takings claim.  We contend that courts have implicitly relied 
upon this overarching notion in evaluating the validity of government 
regulation of a given parcel. 
To ascertain whether a regulatory taking has occurred under 
the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court normally utilizes a three-
factor analysis articulated by Justice Brennan in the 1978 Penn Cen-
tral decision.2  The proportion of the property affected by a regula-
 
* B.A., St. John’s University (N.Y.), 1966; J.D., Willamette University, 1969; M.A. (Histo-
ry), Portland State University, 1973; Urban Studies Certificate, Portland State University, 
1974; LL.M., University College, London, 1978; Diploma in Law, University College, Ox-
ford, 1984; M.A. (Political Thought), University of Durham, 1998. 
** B.A., Mount Holyoke College, 2005; J.D., Lewis and Clark College, Northwestern School 
of Law, 2011. 
1 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 171-74 (Touchstone 
2005, 3d ed.) (1973); Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, GARVEY 
SCHUBERT BARER, http://www.gsblaw.com/news/publication/a_brief_history_of_the_takings 
_clause/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (identifying some of the tensions present in Takings 
Clause jurisprudence). 
2 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  The deci-
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tion is often a decisive factor in affixing a value to the impact of the 
regulation.  However, as this article will examine, the most difficult 
property regulations to evaluate have often been enacted as stopgap 
mechanisms to secure threatened cultural or ecological resources that 
may be present on that property,3 with courts later left to interpret the 
validity of such regulations through fact-intensive inquiries.  Thus, 
Penn Central is sometimes regarded as an outlier decision lacking 
precedent,4 but it nonetheless remains the recognized analysis appli-
cable to testing the limits of environmental regulations, as well as in 
determining the limits of constitutional land use regulations general-
ly. 
II. PENN CENTRAL AND MAJORITARIAN VALUES 
In 1966, twelve years before the Penn Central decision, Con-
gress passed the National Historic Preservation Act,5 the first national 
law to foster preservation of historically and culturally significant 
properties.6  The roots of the preservation movement in New York 
are often attributed to the demolition of Penn Station in October 
1963.7  Penn Station, occupying eight acres over two city blocks, and 
 
sion stated the factors as follows: 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s de-
cisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.  
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, 
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.  So, too, is 
the character of the governmental action.  A “taking” may more readily 
be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a 
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from 
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life 
to promote the common good. 
Id. 
3 Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); see 
Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3 (1986) (criticizing the 
utilitarian view of property); see also William A. Fischel, The Rest of Michelman 1967, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 372 (Kenneth Ayotte ed., 
2011) available at, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wfischel/Papers/the_rest_of_michelman.pdf 
(criticizing the utilitarian view of property). 
4 Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel as a 
Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549, 556-57 (2012). 
5 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006). 
6 Id.  For a timely assessment of the merits of New York preservation laws, see J. Peter 
Byrne, Historic Preservation and its Cultured Despisers: Reflections on the Contemporary 
Role of Preservation Law in Urban Development, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 665 (2012). 
7 Eric. J. Plosky, The Fall and Rise of Pennsylvania Station, Changing Attitudes To-
2
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still considered today to be a magnificent example of the Beaux-Arts 
architectural style, was in significant disrepair at the time.8  The 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company optioned the air rights in the 1950s 
over the soaring waiting room and glass-roofed train terminal in order 
to dismantle and replace it with more profitable uses – present-day 
Madison Square Garden and Penn Station.9  Public protests failed to 
halt this construction.10 
Two years later, New York City established the Landmarks 
Preservation Commission (“Commission”) to oversee and regulate 
redevelopment of architecturally and historically significant proper-
ties.11  Shortly after its formation, the Commission designated Grand 
Central Terminal (“Terminal”) a landmark and conferred certain re-
sponsibilities and use limitations upon the owner.12  The Terminal’s 
owner, Penn Central Transportation Co. (“Penn Central Co.”) also 
faced maintenance and financial obstacles and sought to make use of 
the air space above the Terminal.13  UGP Properties, Inc., an intended 
office building lessee, submitted two alternative development plans 
for a fifty-five and a fifty-three-story office building on top of the 
Terminal, respectively.14  Both plans were rejected by the Commis-
sion as incompatible with the historic character and preservation of 
the Terminal.15  Penn Central Co. did not appeal these decisions, but 
it subsequently filed suit, asserting that the preservation law effected 
a taking without compensation.16 
The Court came to its finding of no taking through articulat-
 
ward Historic Preservation in New York City (2000), http://www.subjectverb.com/www/wri 
ting/thesis.pdf; but see RANDALL MASON, THE ONCE AND FUTURE NEW YORK: HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION AND THE MODERN CITY (Univ. of Minnesota Press 2009) (discounting the 
singular importance of the event as the sole foundation for the preservation movement, but 
discussing its significance to the creation of the Landmarks Preservation Commission); see 
also David W. Dunlap, 50 Years Ago, Sharply Dressed Protesters Stood Up for a Train Sta-
tion They Revered, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2012, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/3 
1/50-years-ago-sharply-dressed-protesters-stood-up-for-a-train-station-they-revered. 
8 SAM ROBERTS, GRAND CENTRAL: HOW A TRAIN STATION TRANSFORMED AMERICA 165 
(Grand Central Publishing 2013). 
9 Id. at 165-66 (stating today, the ceiling height of Penn Station terminal is 125 feet 
lower than that of the original main waiting room). 
10 Id. at 166. 
11 Id. at 168. 
12 Id. at 169. 
13 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116. 
14 Id. at 116-17. 
15 Id. at 117. 
16 Id. at 118. 
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ing and applying the now-familiar three factors to its inquiry: (1) the 
economic impact of the regulation, (2) the extent to which the regula-
tion interferes with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the char-
acter of the government action.17  In evaluating the merits of the Penn 
Central Co. claim, two elements to this seminal analysis emerged that 
have guided later takings cases: first, the nature of the ownership and 
second, the remaining value and size of the parcel and viability of its 
use.18 This second factor has contributed to Penn Central’s legacy 
and provided the foundation for the relevant parcel doctrine, or “par-
cel as a whole” analysis: 
“[t]aking” jurisprudence does not divide a single par-
cel into discrete segments and attempt to determine 
whether rights in a particular segment have been en-
tirely abrogated.  In deciding whether a particular 
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court 
focuses rather both on the character of the action and 
on the nature and extent of the interference with rights 
in the parcel as a whole . . . .19 
As part of its portfolio, Penn Central Co. owned a number of other 
nearby properties that were eligible to receive transferred develop-
ment rights from the Terminal.20  One or two of these properties were 
found expressly eligible for such office building improvements.21  
Accordingly, the economic gain that could be made through building 
higher floors on other sites could have eased the concern of the Court 
in its evaluation of just compensation.22  However, in considering the 
nature and extent of the limitations placed by the Commission (i.e., 
prohibiting exterior changes to the landmark without its permission) 
on the totality of interests in the Penn Central parcel, the Court found 
no taking as its analysis of property rights in the parcel under those 
three factors apparently demonstrated that, even after the Landmark 
designation, there was no justifiable need for compensation.23  How-
ever, the Court did note in dicta that the transferrable rights “un-
doubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has im-
 
17 Id. at 124. 
18 Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992). 
19 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
20 Id. at 115. 
21 Id. at 122. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 138. 
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posed.”24 
Historic preservation was not the only concurrent form of pro-
tective regulations that gave rise to a taking claim in the late 1970s.  
The year after the Court decided Penn Central, it heard a personal 
property case challenging the application of the Eagle Protection and 
Migratory Bird Treaty Acts as a taking.25  The Acts made it illegal to 
engage in the sale or purchase of components of protected birds and 
possession or transportation of bird parts.  Though the Eagle Protec-
tion Act had been in place since 1940,26 by 1963, bald eagles were in 
danger of extinction.  In the lower forty-eight states, only 487 nesting 
pairs remained.27  As a result, in 1962, Congress amended the Act to 
encompass prohibitions on trafficking in feathers, eggshells, and oth-
er fractional parts.28 
L. Douglas Allard and other traders in bird artifacts which 
contained the restricted components were prosecuted for the sale of 
such artifacts.29  They sued, alleging first that the artifacts in their 
possession prior to the date of the statutes should be exempt from 
regulation, and in the alternative, if the Act did apply to their arti-
 
24 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137.  In his seminal book, however, Richard Epstein ques-
tions whether the substitution of air rights from one building to another under common own-
ership can offset an economic burden under landmark preservation regulations, instead posit-
ing that reliance, even in part, upon such a transfer constitutes a different form of taking 
(e.g., if air space is traded to another location, then it follows that the receiving location, too, 
has limited use of its air space – a presumptive exaction on its own).  RICHARD EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 189-90 (1985).  In con-
trast, the authors in Compensation in TDR Programs: Grand Central Terminal and the 
Search for the Holy Grail framed a comment by the New York Court of Appeals’ Judge 
Breitel, questioning the reasonable return that real property owners might or should expect, 
as the backdrop for their inquiry into what might enable an adequate TDR scheme, given 
proximate property developments, societal investments and private interests, and other eco-
nomic theory factors.  See Jon M. Conrad & Dwight H. Merriam, Compensation in TDR 
Programs: Grand Central Terminal and the Search for the Holy Grail, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 
1 (1978). 
25 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52-56 (1979).  The Bald Eagle Protection Act of 
1940 is found at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d, while the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is found at 16 
U.S.C. § 703. 
26 See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Eagle Permits Information page, UNITED STATES 
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE FWS.GOV, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/midwestbird/eagleper 
mits/bagepa.html (giving a history of the Bald Eagle Protection Act) (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014). 
27 Id. 
28 Joint Resolution to Provide Protection for the Golden Eagle, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 
Stat. 1246 (1962). 
29 Andrus, 444 U.S at 54. 
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facts, then the regulations effected a taking.30  Justice Brennan, again 
writing for the majority, noted that Congress had twice reviewed and 
amended the applicable Eagle Protection Act without removing the 
Department’s right to regulate previously owned artifacts.31  In con-
trast, Congress wrote the contemporaneous Endangered Species Act 
to contain an exception for preexisting objects;32 but Congress had 
made no similar exception with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.33  Jus-
tice Brennan concluded that while the Acts prohibited the most prof-
itable use in the bundle of sticks, they did not appropriate ownership 
in its entirety and found no taking, as the right to possess, transport, 
or donate the artifacts remained.34  In 2007, due to such stringent pro-
tections and preservation efforts, the bald eagle was deemed recov-
ered and delisted from the Federal List of Endangered and Threat-
ened Wildlife and Plants.35 
III. SENSITIVE LANDS AND DEVELOPMENT RESTRICTIONS 
Perhaps no area of land use litigation has exemplified the 
practical impact of real property regulations, benefits and burdens 
than takings claims involving environmentally-driven laws restricting 
development.  Historically, the law had supported, if not outright en-
couraged, the conversion of sensitive ecological lands into productive 
agricultural or business use.36  Since the 1600s, over half of the wet-
lands in the coterminous United States have been lost or otherwise 
intentionally drained for development.37  As Penn Central Terminal 
was to the origin of the historic preservation movement, a series of 
 
30 Id. at 54-55. 
31 Id. at 57. 
32 Id. at 62. 
33 Id. 
34 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. 
35 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Bald Eagle Delisting, UNITED STATES FISH AND 
WILDLIFE SERVICE FWS.GOV, http://www.fws.gov/pacific/ecoservices/BaldEagleDelisting. 
htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
36 ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: U.S. WETLAND LAW, POLICY, 
AND POLITICS 5 (2011) (“[I]n the 1900 case of Leovy v. United States, [177 U.S. 621, 623 
(1900),] . . . the Court upheld the right of Louisiana to construct dams that dried out the 
swampy lands.  Indeed, the Court observed that government not only had the power to con-
duct these reclamation efforts, but it was its duty to do so.”). 
37 See, e.g., T.E. Dahl, Wetlands Losses in the United States 1780’s to 1980’s, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE (1990), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Documents/Wetlands-Losses-in-the-United-States-1780s-to-
1980s.pdf. (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
6
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environmental disasters in the 1960s and 1970s similarly served as 
the impetus for restrictions on development of sensitive lands.38  In 
response to toxic waste, severe human health impacts, and a river on 
fire,39 Congress passed a series of landmark protection laws intended 
to halt further ecological degradation and restore the environment.40 
As with landmark protection regulations, development re-
strictions on sensitive lands and Clean Water Act Section 404 remov-
al-fill permit requirements were met with significant resistance, par-
ticularly from those whose ownership and development plans 
predated controls.41  Concurrent with a rise in takings litigation over 
wetland regulations came a greater awareness of the impacts that 
modern industry had on ecological resources and the birth of the 
modern environmental movement.42  Judicial examination of the hy-
drologic connection between newly-regulated sensitive lands and 
navigable waters under the Clean Water Act43 and the Rivers and 
Harbors Act44 mirrored the search for a predictable application of 
Penn Central.  Complex inquiries into whether the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (“Corps”) possessed jurisdiction over various types of 
wetlands were parsed out over contemporaneous cases, beginning 
with a more expansive view of agency authority under United States 
v. Riverside Bayview Homes,45 later narrowed under Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers,46 and 
 
38 See Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Historical Topics (e.g., Rachel Car-
son, “Silent Spring”; Love Canal (1978); Valley of the Drums (1979); Earth Day (1970), all 
available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/historical-topics.) (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
39 See Michael Rotman, Cuyahoga River Fire, Cleveland Historical Society, available 
at http://clevelandhistorical.org/items/show/63#.Uwi9j_ldWP8 (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
40 See, e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321; the 
Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 153; the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451, and the Archaeological 
Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa. 
41 See ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT MERRIAM, & RICHARD FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 366 n.5 
(1999) (noting that approximately 400 wetlands regulatory cases had been brought between 
1960 and 1990, half of which raised Clean Water Act Section 404 permit takings claims and 
other regulatory challenges). 
42 GARDNER, supra note 36, at 7-8. 
43 33 U.S.C. § 1251. 
44 33 U.S.C. § 403. 
45 474 U.S. 121, 134-35 (1985) (upholding the Corps’ authority under the Clean Water 
Act to categorize “wetlands” in a reasonable manner and regulate fill activities on properties 
adjacent to navigable waters where a type of vegetation is present that requires surface or 
ground water saturated soils, and finding no taking). 
46 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (finding that seasonally-inundated isolated ponds do not 
7
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further refined in a split decision in Rapanos v. United States,47 re-
sulting in a site-specific hydrologic analysis of adjacent wetlands.48 
The nuance inherent to wetlands takings determinations mir-
rors the lack of uniformity for a singular relevant parcel analysis.  
Developing a bright line list of guidepost factors to illuminate con-
siderations to ascertain a sufficient loss of property value to constitute 
a taking is difficult given what are often fact intensive, ad hoc deci-
sions.49  For a time, the outcomes of many cases that mounted a tak-
ings challenge reflected pro-environmental preservation concerns.50  
However, later cases, such as Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United 
States51 and Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States.52 reinvig-
 
qualify as intrastate navigable water habitat for migratory birds, and thus are outside the 
scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction). 
47 547 U.S. 715, 739, 742 (2006) (deciding with a plurality of justices holding that 
EPA and Corps jurisdiction may extend over “relatively permanent, standing or continuously 
flowing bodies of water” connected to traditional navigable waters, and to “wetlands with a 
continuous surface connection to” such relatively permanent waters).  Similar to Penn Cen-
tral, this decision prompted much consternation among environmental law practitioners, as it 
has been largely left to lower courts to interpret Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test 
factors.  See, e.g., Jennifer L. Bolger, Post Rapanos: The Regulatory Miasma Engulfing Iso-
lated Wetlands and the Clean Water Act, 10 No. 3 ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COMMITTEE NEWSL. 
8 (August 2009). 
48 Since the Rapanos decision, the EPA and the Corps have issued revised guidance 
and clarification on Clean Water Act jurisdiction, generally stipulating that both Justice 
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test and Justice Scalia’s “continuous surface connection” test 
will be utilized in fact-specific decisions regarding agency jurisdiction where isolated wet-
lands are adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, non-navigable tributaries are not relatively 
permanent, or where wetlands are near but are not adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, giv-
en any hydrologic and ecological connections.  See EPA and Corps’ joint June 2007 Memo-
randum, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Ra-
panos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (rev. Dec. 2, 2008), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2007_6_5_wetlands_RapanosGuid 
ance6507.pdf, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2008_12_3_wetlands 
_CWA_Jurisdiction_Following_Rapanos120208.pdf.  A draft rule was also sent by EPA and 
the Corps to the White House Office of Management and Budget in September 2013, with 
release of the draft rule for notice and comment contingent upon completion of a draft scien-
tific study, available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/fedrgstr_activites/772435 
7376745F48852579E60043E88C/$File/WOUS_ERD2_Sep2013.pdf. 
49 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
50 See MELTZ, supra note 41, at 520-23 (outlining the interplay between environmental 
concerns, takings law concerns, and conservation efforts in the Lake Tahoe and Nantucket 
Island regions). 
51 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. Untied States, 
381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
52 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (stating that the parties spent more than a decade in litigation); see 
Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985), rev’d, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), rev’d, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), appeal filed, 18 
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995), rev’d, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999). 
8
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orated the weight and consequence behind the relevant parcel deter-
mination and illustrated an evolving calculus behind takings valua-
tions. 
Loveladies Harbor explored the importance of the denomina-
tor analysis, but ultimately found in favor of the private property in-
terest.53  In 1958, the plaintiff, Loveladies Harbor, Inc., acquired a 
250-acre parcel, and in 1972, after the Clean Water Act took effect 
that same year, sought to develop the remaining undeveloped 51 
acres.54  After years of negotiations with the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection, the parties settled and the state issued a 
permit for fill of 11.5 of the 51 acres.55  In evaluating Loveladies 
Harbor’s application for a federal Section 404 permit, the Corps was 
informed by the state Department of Environmental Protection that 
its own permit approval was not in conformance with state law re-
quirements.56  The Corps subsequently rejected the permit application 
in 1982.57  Loveladies Harbor challenged the permit denial in the 
Court of Federal Claims, where the court found that the permit denial 
effected a $2,645,500 loss in the fair market value of the parcel.58 
The court made clear its view of the denominator problem in 
takings claims: if it defined the relevant parcel broadly to include the 
entire undeveloped fifty-one acres, then the economic deprivation of 
the use of twelve acres is less proportionately significant.59  Con-
versely, if the inquiry is narrowed to just the affected property then a 
near wipeout of economic value would result.60  Relying heavily up-
on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,61 the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit gave greater weight to a newly articulated fac-
tor in order to determine the relevant property interest – the timing of 
the environmental regulation’s application given the “interest vested 
in the owner, as a matter of state property law, and not within the 
 
53 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1183. 




58 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1174. 
59 Id. at 1180. 
60 Id. 
61 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.  Lucas found a per se or categorical taking if no viable eco-
nomic use remained.  Id. at 1031-32.  The plaintiff in Loveladies Harbor made a similar as-
sertion, but he focused on the smaller portion of his property, which had no use remaining, 
while the defendant focused upon the entire parcel, which would require use of the default 
Penn Central analysis.  Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180-81. 
9
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power of the state to regulate under common law nuisance doc-
trine.”62  Predictably, Loveladies Harbor argued that the denominator 
should apply to the narrower parcel and property interest under con-
sideration, while the state argued for the broader and more inclusive 
geographic approach.63  In upholding the Federal Claims Court’s de-
cision finding a taking, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
ultimately determined that Loveladies Harbor’s land developed or 
sold before the imposition of new wetlands regulations should not be 
included as a part of the parcel under review.64 
Florida Rock also examined the relevant parcel factors, and 
the case illustrates how the same facts can be interpreted in the de-
nominator analyses by different courts under divergent theories and 
may lead to different results.  Parcel owner Florida Rock Industries, 
Inc. had purchased 1,560 acres of wetlands prior to the passage of the 
Clean Water Act, intending to extract limestone beneath the property, 
a process that necessitated the destruction of on-site wetlands.65  
Though it initially began mining operations without a permit, when 
notified by the Corps of its illegal activity Florida Rock ceased opera-
tions and began permit negotiations with the federal agency.66  The 
Corps initially agreed to provide a permit for three years of mining on 
approximately ninety-eight acres, but after reviewing Florida Rock’s 
revised application, the Corps denied the permit on environmental 
impact grounds.67  The Court of Federal Claims found that prior to 
permit denial, the value of the land was $10,500 per acre, while post-
denial, the property’s value was negligible, and accordingly awarded 
Florida Rock $1,029,000 plus interest and attorneys’ fees.68 
The case was subsequently appealed, remanded, and appealed 
again.69  During the first appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit found that the parcel inquiry had contemplated only the inter-
 
62 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179.  See also Courtney Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance 
and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 614-16 (2000) (discussing 
fairness and strategic conceptual severance by both owners and the government as applied in 
this case, a narrower analysis that the court avoided by adopting a larger denominator in its 
parcel determination). 
63 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180-81. 
64 Id. at 1181. 
65 Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 25. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 26. 
69 Id. at 25. 
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est in the limestone, whereas the correct value assessment should 
have been made in appraising the whole of the interests in the proper-
ty.70  On remand, the parties submitted competing assessments of the 
value of the property and comparable sales.71  Again, the Federal 
Claims Court found a taking.72  Nevertheless, on the second and final 
appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court, after reviewing evidence on 
the record of unsolicited offers to buy the property as well as other 
wetland sales at the time of the permit denial, looked to the “market 
as a whole” in support for its decision.73  Given that the value of the 
property was not eliminated entirely through the permit denial but 
was merely reduced by an estimated $6,000 per acre, the court held 
that no taking had occurred.74 
On remand from the Federal Circuit, the Court of Federal 
Claims posited the case outcome and analysis of the parcel as a whole 
conundrum as follows: 
The notion that the government can take two 
thirds of your property and not compensate you but 
must compensate you if it takes 100% has a ring of ir-
rationality, if not unfairness, about it.  If the law said 
that those injured by tortious conduct could only have 
their estates compensated if they were killed, but not 
themselves if they could still breathe, no matter how 
seriously injured, we would certainly think it odd, if 
not barbaric.  Yet in takings trials, we have the gov-
ernment trying to prove that the patient has a few 
breaths left, while the plaintiffs seek to prove, often at 
great expense, that the patient is dead.75 
 
70 Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1563. 
71 Id. at 1564. 
72 Id. at 1562. 
73 Id. at 1565. 
74 Id. at 1572. 
75 Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23-24; see also supra note 52 (outlining the procedural 
history of the Florida Rock case).  The decision also echoed a significant factor that often 
plays a background role in case outcomes over wetlands development restriction challenges, 
as it did in Loveladies – the timing of the federal and state law with particular regard to 
whether such regulations were in place prior to purchase of the property.  See also David F. 
Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, 
29 ENVTL. L. 821, 842 (1999).  With Florida Rock, the owners had purchased the property 
only months before the Clean Water Act was enacted.  Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 25.  The 
economic burden of the regulation seemed to tip the scales in the owners’ favor, with the 
partial taking that the court attributed to the regulation in its “market as a whole” analysis 
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Acknowledging that not all economic use of the property had been 
taken under the Penn Central analysis but that nonetheless a partial 
regulatory taking had occurred within the ninety-eight-acre parcel, 
the court awarded Florida Rock $752,444 plus interest from the date 
of the taking and encouraged the parties to engage in settlement 
agreements in lieu of additional appeals.76 
IV. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT PARCEL OBSERVATIONS 
While some have detailed various objective tests in relevant 
parcel inquiry cases,77 the cases do not reflect such a facile analysis; 
however, several commonalities are frequent components of the cas-
es.78  This section reflects these commonalities. 
A. Penn Central Remains the Rule 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency79 serves as the case that most commonly stands for 
the temporal application of the parcel as a whole inquiry and rein-
forced the lasting significance of Penn Central.80  The facts of the 
case were driven by an urgent need for protection and restoration of 
Lake Tahoe and implemented through land use moratoria.81  Devel-
opment adjacent to the lake significantly affected water quality and 
had the effect of adding sediment and nutrient loads, so that in 1980, 
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed two successive mora-
 
reflecting the balancing test undertaken by the court.  See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for 
Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant 
Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 201 (2004).  See also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 
F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), in which completion of a developer’s phased development project 
was frustrated due to increased scope of regulation; nonetheless, the court did not find a tak-
ing. 
76 Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23. 
77 See, e.g., John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994) (articulating an independent economically viable develop-
ment test referenced in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001)); STEVEN J. 
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 7-7(e)(5) (4th ed. 2009) (suggesting a “commercial unit” 
test generally in real estate transactions in the area). 
78 Eagle, supra note 4, at 556-57. 
79 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
80 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 
(2005). 
81 John D. Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings 
Decision, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11235 (2002). 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 2, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/13
2014] THE “PARCEL AS A WHOLE” IN CONTEXT 443 
toria on development, cumulating in a total ban lasting thirty-two 
months, to allow time to draft and implement a regional plan and im-
plementing rules.82  Landowners sued, claiming a temporary taking.83  
At the district court level, the plaintiffs’ claims of a partial taking 
were rejected under Penn Central but validated under their total, al-
beit temporary, deprivation of economic use theory under Lucas.84  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court conclusion that a 
temporary taking had occurred, determining that Lucas applies only 
where all productive use is permanently denied.85  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Stevens rejected the notion that one could sever 
dozens of months of regulation from the overall fee simple estate to 
serve as the basis of a taking; both temporal and physical aspects of 
property must be seen as part of the parcel as a whole.86  Temporary 
restrictions that will terminate at a future, ascertained point pass with 
time and largely leave the parcel in its entirety unaffected.  Accord-
ingly, unless categorical takings are implicated through physical in-
vasion or deprivation of total economic use,87 the Penn Central fac-
tors govern.88 
B. Common Ownership Provides Impetus for a 
Presumption of Contiguous Whole 
In a recent case, Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States,89 a 
development company was denied use of a mosquito impoundment 
site by the Corps; however, the Federal Circuit, on appeal from the 
Court of Federal Claims, found no unified scheme or other evidence 
of intended inclusion of that site within a greater development plan 
 
82 Id.  Temporary moratoria were enacted after Tahoe Regional Preservation Authority 
(“TRPA”) was unable to meet Congressional deadlines to set environmental threshold carry-
ing capacities for Lake Tahoe.  See also Angela Schmitz, Taking Shape: Temporary Takings 
and the Lucas Per Se Rule in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Authority, 82 OR. L. REV. 189, 198-200 (2003). 
83 Echeverria, supra note 81. 
84 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 316. 
85 Id. at 319. 
86 Id. at 331. 
87 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (holding that no viable economic use for the land 
and no administrative process for relief is a required element); Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1992) (defining physical invasion of property). 
88 For further discussion of these points, see Steven Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Cen-
tral Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. (2014) (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359566, at 37-41. 
89 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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and treated that parcel alone as the relevant parcel for a takings anal-
ysis.90  Lost Tree had purchased 2,750 acres on a barrier island, other 
islands, and a peninsula, and proceeded with development on a 
piecemeal basis.91  Its first 404 permit for a large portion of its hold-
ings was approved after modifications; the lot at issue at the time was 
an impoundment site and was not included in development plans or 
plat recordings.92  After the company learned through a neighboring 
development that such lots could potentially be used to generate miti-
gation credits, it submitted a permit application in order to utilize the 
site for that purpose, though no such use was made of the site, which 
was then overlooked by its owner for a number of years.93 
In reviewing the nature of the development to ascertain the 
appropriate parcel denominator, the Federal Circuit both rejected the 
aggregate of plaintiff’s holdings, as well as the lot alone as the rele-
vant parcel.94  The Court of Federal Claims had combined the lot at 
issue with another contiguous plat and other scattered undeveloped 
wetlands.95  With that combination, the value of the relevant parcel 
then diminished by 58.4%, so that no taking was found.96  In this and 
other analogous cases, the absence of economic expectations and the 
distinct temporal treatment of the parcel led Federal Circuit courts to 
believe that development of the lot had simply been ignored by the 
developer in the master plans.97  Here, Lost Tree had left some lots 
undeveloped purposefully, advertising them as open spaces, not as 
part of a unified development scheme or development plan.98  That 
unintentional separate treatment by the developers of this leftover 
parcel appeared to be a significant factor in the outcome of this case 
in which the Court of Federal Claims’ aggregation of the lot at issue 
with other surrounding lots was rejected, the lot at issue was viewed 
 
90 Id. at 1288. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1289. 
93 Id. at 1290-91. 
94 Lost Tree, 707 F. 3d at 1291. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1290.  The court’s view of the undeveloped parcel at issue, originally omitted, 
then proposed as a wildlife open space preserve in one permit application, might be viewed 
as the “reciprocity of advantage” discussed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. McMahon, 260 U.S. 
393 (1922), as open spaces, setbacks, and other regulatory requirements contribute to well-
planned communities.  Similarly, the externalities sustained by the Lost Tree plaintiffs are 
part of such burdens of land use regulations.  See MELTZ, supra note 41, at 580-83. 
98 Lost Tree, 707 F.3d at 1293. 
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as the relevant parcel and a taking was found.99 
Daniels v. Area Plan Commission of Allen County100 reflects 
the inverse situation, where common ownership afforded a beneficial 
presumption of a contiguous whole.  Plaintiffs bought property in a 
subdivision that was platted for eighty lots and restricted to residen-
tial use via a restrictive covenant.101  The owners of three lots along a 
major north-south corridor requested rezoning in order to redevelop 
the properties for commercial uses.102  Against the plaintiffs’ objec-
tions, the Allen County Planning Commission approved the rezoning 
request and vacated the restrictive covenant.103  The plaintiffs filed a 
takings claim and were granted a preliminary injunction at the district 
court level that voided the removal of the restrictive covenant.104  
While ripeness was the primary issue, as the plaintiffs did not avail 
themselves of state court relief, the court reviewed the restrictive 
covenant and takings claim through an extensive analysis of the sub-
division as a whole.105  The voiding of the covenant was ultimately 
found to be a taking that conferred no public benefit, despite no de-
monstrable loss in property value of owners’ neighboring land. 
C. Facial Takings Claims Often Fail, Absent Specific 
Valuation of Denied Use 
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,106 
petitioners, an association of coal operators and corporations, chal-
lenged two sections of a Pennsylvania Subsidence Act (“Subsidence 
Act”).107  Section 4 of the Subsidence Act, as implemented by admin-
istrative rules of the Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources 
(“DER”), required approximately fifty percent of coal beneath three 
categories of structures to remain in place for certain uses: public 
 
99 Id. at 1294. 
100 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002). 
101 Id. at 449. 
102 Id. at 449-50. 
103 Id. at 450. 
104 Id. at 451. 
105 Daniels, 306 F.3d at 459-61.  The court also found that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim 
was ripe, as the available state remedies (monetary damages and injunctive relief) would not 
provide adequate relief and, therefore, met the exception to the state remedies exhaustion 
requirement set forth in Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 
U.S. 172 (1985).  Id. at 457-58. 
106 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
107 Id. at 474. 
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buildings and noncommercial buildings used by public; residential 
dwellings; and cemeteries.108  Section 6 of the Subsidence Act al-
lowed DER to revoke a mining permit if coal extraction would cause 
damage to one of the three protected categories of uses and structures 
(and the permit holder had not repaired damage, deposited an equal 
sum, or satisfied claims within six months of subsidence).109  At the 
District Court level, the court found for the DER and respondents, 
holding that although severely restricting a mineral right on some 
portions of a parcel involves one of the more important sticks in the 
bundle of rights, that action alone is not facially indicative of a tak-
ing.110  The Court of Appeals, however, did not view the support es-
tate as a singular property interest, but as part of the greater whole – 
inclusive of both the surface and mineral estate in the land’s entire-
ty.111 
The Court, finding for the state, distinguished Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon,112 on two grounds: first, unlike the Kohler Act 
that altogether prohibited mining causing subsidence under struc-
tures, here, health and safety were at stake; and second, the Kohler 
Act effectively enacted a blanket prohibition against mining in cer-
tain areas and was viewed by the Court as largely protective of pri-
vate interests.113  Here, the purpose of the Subsidence Act was to pro-
tect the public welfare.114  Notably, the question presented was not an 
as-applied challenge but whether the enactment of the Subsidence 
Act itself was a facial taking.115  As petitioners only brought a facial 
 
108 Id. at 476.  Conversely, the coal companies had an estimated 1.46 million tons of 
coal available in mines – with the restricted portion constituting less than 2% of the total re-
source.  See MELTZ, supra note 41, at 410. 
109 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 477. 
110 Id. at 479.  For a lengthier discussion of the history behind subsurface mining re-
strictions, see MELTZ, supra note 41, at 411-16. 
111 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 480. 
112 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
113 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 484.  The nature of investment-backed expecta-
tions in the vertical severance context, particularly as in Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone 
Bituminous, where the mining companies may have once owned both the surface and subsur-
face rights, raises interesting implications for the Takings Clause.  See WRIGHT, supra note 
75, at 201 (discussing whether the Takings Clause is designed or intended to insure all land-
owners against risky investments or only protect against catastrophic losses). 
114 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 474. 
115 Id. at 493, 495.  In contrast, the company in Pennsylvania Coal had shown that the 
statute precluded its ability to engage in its business.  See Susan M. Stedfast, Regulatory 
Takings: A Historical Overview and Legal Analysis for Natural Resource Management, 29 
ENVTL. L. 881, 901 (1999). 
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challenge, some of their arguments were based on statistics and esti-
mated costs and thus made discerning the relevant parcel more com-
plex.116  Justice Stevens noted in his decision that irrespective of the 
Subsidence Act, some of the underground coal would have had to 
remain in place given extraction constraints.117  Petitioners also 
acknowledged in interrogatories that only two percent of coal would 
need to be left in place under the Subsidence Act and were unable to 
demonstrate the isolated effect of the regulation alone.118  Relying 
upon prior parcel as a whole jurisprudence, the Court rejected an at-
tempt to isolate and frame the coal into the sole property interest af-
fected – either as a specific volume of coal or as a separate support 
estate.119  Citing Penn Central, the Court explained that while “verbal 
formulizations” do not provide a prescriptive blueprint for determin-
ing the baseline condition of the property being taken, they do often 
provide sufficient sideboards (e.g., through the character and nature 
of action and interference) to review the merits of claims.120  The sur-
face regulation character of the action here was common under zon-
ing regulations and, as noted in the Court of Appeals’ decision, the 
support estate exists to serve either the minerals or surface estate and 
cannot be feasibly segmented from the parcel.121 
D. The Influence of Prior Knowledge in the Parcel as 
a Whole Analysis 
In those cases where developers and owners are aware prior to 
their purchase of existing property restrictions affording limited eco-
nomic use or the likelihood that development permits will be denied 
and the owner decides to proceed nonetheless, courts have been sig-
nificantly less inclined to find a taking.  In Ciampitti v. United 
States,122 the real estate developer plaintiff bought beachfront lots in 
New Jersey in the early 1980s bordering, in part, on an area designat-
ed as wetlands.  The properties were below grade and did not have 
 
116 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 495. 
117 Id. at 498. 
118 Id. at 496, 498. 
119 Id. at 497-98; see also Stedfast, supra note 115, at 913 (discussing the application 
of Penn Central’s ‘reciprocity of advantage’ and the public benefit that accrues from the 
prevention of harm to the community through such regulations). 
120 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 497. 
121 Id. at 498, 501. 
122 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991). 
17
Sullivan and Power: The "Parcel as a Whole" in Context
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
448 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
streets or utilities.123  Over the subsequent years, the developer and 
various business partners invested in dozens more lots, some owned 
by a family predecessor venture group.124  In 1983, the plaintiff pur-
chased forty-five lots; fourteen were designated wetlands and eight-
een were subject to some form of regulation.125  As the neighboring 
area had, in part, been developed at the time of purchase, and since 
the properties contained a deed grant that allowed removal-fill, the 
developer believed that he would nonetheless be permitted to develop 
the area notwithstanding federal limitations.126  Negotiated settle-
ments between the state and developer allowed for upland develop-
ment, but after the applicable wetland permit application was denied, 
the developer filed suit alleging a taking.127  In finding that no taking 
had occurred, the court, in its relevant parcel analysis, was perhaps 
most influenced by the actual and constructive notice of the applica-
ble wetland regulations prior to purchase, thereby reducing any legit-
imate investment-backed expectations.128 
Walcek v. United States.129 provides an analogous case, where 
actions by the developer undoubtedly tainted the evaluation of its tak-
ings claim.  Prior to the Clean Water Act, the plaintiff purchased 14.5 
acres in two transactions, failing to conduct due diligence on suitabil-
ity for development prior to purchase.130  Though the town had zoned 
the property for residential use, approximately four-to-five acres were 
regulated as wetlands by the State of Delaware.131  During an at-
tempted sale, the plaintiffs discovered the applicable regulations, and 
then knowingly began to fill the property without a permit, terminat-
ing that activity only after the issuance of a cease and desist order.132  
After a takings complaint was filed, the Corps authorized some de-
velopment in a 1996 permit conditioned on wetland remediation 
 
123 Id. at 312. 
124 Id. at 312-13. 
125 Id. at 313. 
126 Id. at 315. 
127 Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct. at 316-17. 
128 Id. at 315; see Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053 (2000) (finding no taking when the landowner similarly contin-
ued to proceed with property development irrespective of increasing regulation); see also 
Coursen, supra note 75, at 840. 
129 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
130 Id. at 1351. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 1352. 
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elsewhere.133  Accordingly, the Federal Claims Court determined that 
it was not a categorical taking.134  On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
concurred that the proper acreage was what had been submitted to the 
court originally: that out of the 14.5 whole acres, the 13.2 federal 
wetland acres had been impacted by regulation, and since the 1996 
permit allowed 2.2 acres to be developed, all economically viable use 
had not been deprived.135  The plaintiff’s permit denial was thus not a 
categorical taking, as the court’s relevant analysis found that the re-
maining portion of the property that could be developed provided an 
economically viable use.136 
E. Interruptions in Ownership and Takings Claims 
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,137 petitioner Anthony Palazzolo 
had invested in three undeveloped salt-water marshland waterfront 
properties with business partners in 1959.138  He later bought out his 
associates but ownership of the parcels remained under the corporate 
name.139  Petitioner submitted various applications for residential lot 
development; all were ultimately denied by state agencies.140  In 1971 
and 1983, Rhode Island enacted further regulations protecting salt 
marshes as coastal wetlands.141  In 1978, the corporation’s charter 
was administratively revoked, and petitioner inherited the property as 
the sole shareholder.142  He subsequently filed an inverse condemna-
tion action after the final denial of a beach club proposal in 1985, 
seeking $3.15 million in damages derived from his appraisal of the 
property’s highest and best use, i.e., for residential subdivision lots.143  
The lower courts ruled in favor of the state, finding that an upland 
parcel of the property still had value, Palazzolo’s claim was not yet 
ripe, and, furthermore, he had no right to challenge pre-1978 regula-
 
133 Id. at 1353. 
134 Walcek, 303 F.3d at 1353-54. 
135 Id. at 1356. 
136 Id. at 1355-56. 
137 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
138 Id. at 613. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 614. 
141 Id. 
142 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614. 
143 Id. at 615-16. 
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tions because of the interruption in the chain of title.144 
The relevant parcel issue before the Court involved a change 
in the chain of title of the properties from Palazzolo’s joint ownership 
with his associates to his later acquisition of the subject properties as 
a sole owner, which commenced after the regulations were enact-
ed.145  The state argued that the passage of title from the corporation 
to Palazzolo as an individual should serve to restart the clock on the 
permissibility of takings challenges.146  The Court was not persuaded, 
instead holding that the effect of such a rule would be draconian.147  
Such a practice could effectively insulate a state against takings 
claims by later landowners, regardless of how egregious the re-
striction might be and would equally bar successors or inheritors to 
property from later bringing claims.148  Equally, the Court observed 
that notice of prior statutes does not obviate a state’s “duty to com-
pensate for what is taken.”149 
As the Court found the petitioner’s claims were not unripe, 
the case was remanded to the state Supreme Court for further exami-
nation of the economic impact of the denial of the permits.150  Justice 
O’Connor concurred in a separate opinion, also cautioning that the 
discussion of the relationship between timing of ownership and regu-
lation is not to be given undue weight, as the “polestar instead re-
mains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other 
cases that govern partial regulatory takings.”151  Nevertheless, as Jus-
tice O’Connor noted in her concurrence, a landowner’s notice of a 
regulation was not irrelevant: “[I]t would be just as much error to ex-
punge this consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to 
accord it exclusive significance.”152 
An earlier, if unusual, takings case further illustrates the ten-
sion between proffered benefits and burdens of land use controls.  In 
 
144 Id. at 616. 
145 Id. at 626. 
146 Id. at 626-28; see F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of 
Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation 
Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 121, 131-32 (2003) (noting that the effect of 
Palazzolo served to reinforce Penn Central as the rule, even when substantial losses in prop-
erty value are sustained, absent a Lucas categorical taking). 
147 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627-28. 
148 Id. at 627. 
149 Id. at 628. 
150 Id. at 632. 
151 Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
152 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633. 
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Hodel v. Irving,153 the plaintiffs were Oglala Sioux heirs that brought 
a takings challenge to the Indian Land Consolidation Act.154  The in-
tent behind the statute was to keep tribal land under tribal ownership, 
as allotment of lands often ended up in non-tribal hands.155  The Act 
attempted to preserve ownership through a prohibition on property 
transfers to multiple interests.156  The Act provided that where the in-
terest represented two percent or less of the total acreage, it escheated 
to the tribe.157  Deprived of ownership through this process, the plain-
tiffs brought an as-applied takings claim.158  The Court of Appeals 
overturned the district court’s holding that the Act was constitutional, 
finding that the plaintiffs had a right to control disposition of their 
own property.159  The Supreme Court concurred that the right to leave 
property to relatives and others in death was one of the most valuable 
sticks in the bundle of sticks and that the seizure of tribal property 
upon an owner’s death and transfer of title to the tribe exceeded any 
reasonable policy goals of the statute.160  Here, the parcel was not on-
ly the immediate, but also the future, interest in ownership.161 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a philosophical construct, it is impractical to believe that 
an objective relevant parcel takings test can be construed from such 
highly fact-specific cases often driven by changing regulatory priori-
ties.  On balance, relevant parcel inquiries may also provide a more 
fair and comprehensive, albeit somewhat subjective approach to the 
application of the Penn Central factors.162  However, on behalf of 
those who bear the primary burden of such regulations, there is much 
value to be sought in refining and clarifying multifactor analyses of 
 
153 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
154 Id. at 709-10. 
155 Id. at 712. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 709. 
158 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 716. 
161 Id. at 717. 
162 See Dwight Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353 
(2003); see also Daniel R. Mandelker, Speech: New Property Rights under the Taking 
Clause, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 19 (1997) (echoing this reticence to set formulaic tests in his 
critique of segmentation analysis’s contribution to takings theory). 
21
Sullivan and Power: The "Parcel as a Whole" in Context
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
452 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
the relevant parcel.163  There are some factors that may be gleaned 
from the cases thus far, however: 
 
1.  Penn Central remains the default analysis for any regulato-
ry takings analysis that is not in a presumptive per se category.164 
 
2.  Contiguous parcels in the same ownership will be pre-
sumed to be the relevant parcel for takings purposes. 
 
3.  Facial claims involving multiple parcels in the same own-
ership will not likely result in a successful regulatory takings claim.  
Specific facts must be analyzed. 
 
4.  Concepts as indefinite as “property rights,” fairness, and 
investment-backed expectations are significant latent factors in de-
termining whether a parcel may be carved out from other ownerships 
and treated separately. 
 
5.  Similarly, courts are not supportive of unlawful conduct, 
such as the knowing failure to secure required permits, in evaluating 
a relevant parcel. 
 
6.  Conversely, a court may be impressed by the treatment of 
a parcel as separate from other lands under the same ownership over 
time. 
 
In short, the recognition of the allocation of burdens and ben-
efits of economic life by a court in dealing with the contention that a 
parcel should be treated separately is not governed by a simple binary 
equation.  Rather, the cases demonstrate that the judicial task is to 
weigh and balance an open-ended number of factors to achieve an 
optimum constellation of property rights, fairness, and investment-
backed expectations.  While the struggle to achieve that balance is 
difficult, in the absence of the Supreme Court’s cutting the Gordian 
 
163 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that “[t]here is an 
inherent tendency towards circularity . . . for if the owner’s reasonable expectations are 
shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends 
to become what courts say it is.”); see also Eagle, supra note 4, at 552. 
164 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432, 440 (demonstrating 
alternative analytical frameworks to the Penn Central approach). 
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